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CASE NOTES
TORTS-INVASION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: LAPSE
OF TIME AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
NEWSWORTHINESS PRIVILEGE
The plaintiff was the mother of fourteen-year-old Mary Lou Wagner,
the victim of a brutal rape-murder in Chicago on November 29, 1957.
The local press and the wire services reported the crime and the appre-
hension of the slayer. In March and April, 1958, five independent "de-
tective magazines" each reported and published stories of the Wagner
murder. These stories contained factual accounts of the crime and the
apprehension of the murderer, pictures of the deceased and the plaintiff
and information as to the plaintiff's age and place of employment.
The plaintiff,1 seeking damages for mental pain and suffering, brought
an action in the District Court of the United States in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois charging each of the five publishing companies with in-
vading her right of privacy by printing stories disclosing her identity
and portraying her likeness without her authority. On the defendants'
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the matters published
were of public interest and newsworthy, the District Court, Judge J. Sam
Perry, presiding, ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the ac-
tion. Upon appeal by the plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in an opinion written by Judge Elmer Schnacken-
berg reversed the District Court and stated that a jury could find that the
events surrounding the death of Mary Lou Wagner had ceased to be news
and, therefore, the publication of these events by the defendants consti-
tuted an invasion of privacy. 2 On re-hearing the Court of Appeals re-
versed its prior decision and affirmed the District Court's judgment for
the defendants. The appellate court in its subsequent holding found that
because the plaintiff was a witness at the trial of her daughter's murderer
and the publishing by defendants was contemporaneous with this trial,
there was, in fact, no lapse of time which would extinguish the privilege
of the press to publish newsworthy materials. Wagner v. Fawcett Publi-
cations, 307 F.2d. 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
The action for invasion of privacy was not generally recognized as a
separate action until 1890. In that year Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis wrote the article8 that laid the foundation for the modern tort of
invasion of privacy. They reasoned that, "the design of the law must be to
1 Although the plaintiff also brought suit as administrator of her daughter's estate,
discussion of her individual suit is only pertinent here.
2This opinion has been withdrawn.
aWarren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
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protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate
concern, from being dragged into undesirable and undesired pub-
licity.. . .-4 The creation of this cause of action necessarily requires that
a balance be struck between the freedom of the press and the individual's
right of privacy. Since application of this tort action might, therefore,
have limited the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press, Warren
and Brandeis pointed out that "the right of privacy does not prohibit
publication of matter which is of public or general interest." 5
Today, the action for invasion of privacy is recognized in one form or
another by statute in three jurisdictions6 and by common law decision in
thirty-one others.7 In four,8 the action has been rejected by the courts and
not recognized by the legislature. However, because of the zealously pro-
tected privilege of newspapers and other forms of mass communication
media to report items of general or public interest, the courts have held
4 Id., at 214. 5 Ibid.
6 Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-8 and 76-4-9 (1953); Va. Code Ann. S 8-650 (1950); Civil
Rights Law §§ 50-52 (N.Y.).
7 Alabama: Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Arizona: Reed v. Real
Detective Pub. Co. 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); California: Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co.,
38 Cal. 2d 273, 231 P.2d 565 (1951); Connecticut: Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Super. 400,
156 A. 2d 476 (1959); Delaware: Miller v. National Broadcasting Company, 157 F. Supp.
240 (D. Del. 1957); District of Columbia: Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305
(D.D.C. 1948); Florida: Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Georgia:
Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Illinois: Eick v. Perk
Dog Food Co., 347 Il. App. 293, 106 N.E. 2d 742 (1952); Indiana: Continental Optical
Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E. 2d 306 (1949); Iowa: Bremmer v. Journal
Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W. 2d 762 (1957); Kansas: Kunz v. Allen, 102
Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Kentucky: Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927); Louisiana: Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1927); Maryland:
Graham v. Baltimore Post Co. (Decided by Baltimore Superior Court in 1932; reported
in 22 Ken. L.J. 108); Michigan: Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.
2d 911 (1948); Mississippi: Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951);
Missouri: Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); Montana: Welsh
v. Roehm, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952); Nevada: Norman v. City of Las Vegas,
64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947); New Jersey: McGuvern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24,
43A. 2d 514 (1945); New Mexico: Hubbard v. Journal Pub. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P. 2d
147 (1962); North Carolina: Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55
(1938); Ohio: Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E. 2d 340 (1956); Oklahoma:
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953); Oregon: Hinish
v. Meier & Frank Co., Inc., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P. 2d 438 (1941); Pennsylvania: Jenkins
v. Dell Publishing Co., 251 F. 2d 447 (1958); South Carolina: Holloman v. Life Ins. Co.
of Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E. 2d 169 (1940); South Dakota: Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises,
Inc., 119 N.W. 2d 914 (1963); Tennessee: Langford v. Vanderbilt University, 199 Tenn.
389, 287 S.W. 2d 32 (1955); West Virginia: Roach v. Harper, 143 W.V. 869, 105 S.E.
2d 564 (1937).
8 Nebraska: Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W. 2d 803 (1955);
Rhode Island: Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13 (1909), 73 A. 97; Texas: Milner
v. Red River Valley Pub. Co., 249 S.W. 2d 227, Tex. Civ. App., (1952); Wisconsin:
Judevine v. Benzies-Montayne Fuel & Whse. Co.; 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).
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that people who have become involved in events of public interest have
lost their right of privacy.9
The United States Supreme Court has held that not only newspapers,
but magazines as well, are entitled to the protection of the First Amend-
ment. In Winters v. New York,'0 the Court emphasized this in the follow-
ing language:
Thought we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these maga-
zines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature."
The Supreme Court has also held that publications which entertain rather
than inform are protected by the First Amendment:
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the pro-
tection of that basic right.12
Therefore, the fact that a magazine may entertain and not inform is no
basis for denying to that magazine the newsworthiness privilege and
First Amendment protections. Although Burstyn v. Wilson'8 involved the
application of the First Amendment to motion pictures, the Supreme
Court stated that the profit motive forms no basis for denying a medium
its constitutional right of free expression.14 The Court of Appeals, in its
first opinion in the instant case, held that the time lapse, robbing the arti-
cles of newsworthiness, constituted an invasion of the right of privacy.
The original Appellate Court decision weighed whether the four
months lapse of time between the crime and the publication destroyed the
defense of newsworthiness. In answering defendants' contention that the
death of Mary Lou Wagner would never cease to be "news" the Appellate
Court stated:
... we are of the opinion that the trier of facts could find the articles in ques-
tion, published months after the death of Mary Lou Wagner, had ceased to be
news and for that reason these articles were not published in news media, but
in magazines sold for the entertainment of their readers. By our holding we in
no way suppress the legitimate publication of news; rather we condemn the
pursuit for commercial purposes of those who may have been connected with
matters which were, at the time of the occurrence, newsworthy. When the
news media have served their proper function in reporting current events, pri-
vate individuals involved therein sink back into the solitude which is the right of
every person. That solitude involves a privacy which no publication has a right
to thereafter invade solely for the purpose of selling to its readers lurid ac-
counts of tragedy.
9 Buzinski v. Do-All Company, 31 111. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E. 2d 577 (1961).
10 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
"1333 U.S. at 510. 13 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
12 Ibid. 14 343 U.S. 495, 501-02.
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This holding represents a departure from prior decisions in invasion of
privacy cases in that it holds that a lapse of time is sufficient to erase the
"newsworthiness" privilege.
The Appellate Court of California in Smith v. National Broadcasting
Company15 held that a passage of three months time from the occurence
of a newsworthy event' 6 to its broadcast on a radio program was not a
factor to be considered in determining whether plaintiff had resumed a
position of solitude in the community. In holding that the plaintiff could
not maintain an action for invasion of privacy the court concluded that:
"It is well established ... that the mere passage of time does not preclude
the publication of such incidents from the life of one formerly in the
public eye which are already public property."'17
Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc.' involved a six month lapse of
time between the happening of the event and its publication in de-
fendant's magazine. When an airplane crashed into the Empire State
Building in New York City, Molony rushed to the aid of the victims of
the disaster and gave them first aid treatment. He became a national hero
overnight and received a medal from the American Legion. Six months
after the accident, Boy Comics published a cartoon story about Molony's
deeds. Subsequently, Molony brought an action for invasion of privacy.
In denying recovery to Molony the court said, "it is well settled that the
right of privacy does not prohibit the publication of matter which is of
legitimate public or general interest, although no longer current."'1
Even a lapse of time of ten years,20 fifteen years,21 even of nineteen
years22 from the date of the event to its subsequent broadcast or publica-
tion has been held insufficient to destroy the newsworthiness privilege. In
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications,23 the California District Court of Appeal
said, "If the necessary elements which would permit the publication of
factual matter are present, mere lapse of time does not prohibit publica-
tion."24
15 138 Cal. App. 2d. 807, 292 P. 2d. 600 (1956).
16The plaintiff reported to the police the escape of a black panther that caused
wide spread panic. Although the plaintiff believed the report to be true, it turned out
false.
17 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 814, 292 P. 2d 600, 604.
Is 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S. 2d. 119 (1950).
19 Id. at 170, 98 N.Y.S. 2d. at 122.
20 Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d. 704, 211 P. 2d. 320 (1949).
21 Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F. 2d. 1017 (7th Cir. 1951).
22 Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, 201 Cal. App. 2d. 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405. (1962).
23 Ibid.
24 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 746, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414.
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The leading case on the question of whether a lapse of time alone is
sufficient to destroy the newsworthiness privilege in Sidis v. F-R Publish-
ing Corporation.25 In 1910 Sidis was a famous child prodigy who was well
known to newspaper readers of the period because of his mathematical
prowess. In the years that followed his celebrated graduation from Har-
vard College at the age of sixteen, Sidis underwent a serious change. He
became an obscure clerk and disappeared from public view. The New
Yorker, after discovering what became of him published an article in 1937
that was, "merciless in its dissection of intimate details," 26 of Sidis' life.
The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, denied recovery to
Sidis in his suit against F-R Publishing Corporation for invasion of privacy
by holding that by reason of his unusual achievements in the past he was
still a newsworthy figure twenty-seven years later.
Smith v. Doss 27 is an interesting case involving the disappearance of a
man named John Lindgren in 1905. Lindgren was last seen driving a
wagon on a lonely country road late at night. The next morning the
empty wagon was found but there was no trace of Lindgren. The plain-
tiffs' father, John Sobrey, was indicted for Lindgren's murder and was
held for five months before his release was granted because of insufficient
evidence. Twenty-five years later, in 1930, the mystery surrounding the
disappearance of John Lindgren was finally solved, when it was discovered
that he had actually not been murdered but had died a natural death in
California. In 1946, over forty years after the disappearance of Lindgren,
the defendant broadcasted a radio program about the strange case of John
Lindgren. Subsequent to the broadcast, the plaintiffs sued the defendant
contending that the broadcast was an invasion of their right of privacy.
The Alabama Supreme Court denied recovery on the ground that "The
passage of time could not give privacy to his acts because the story of John
Lindgren is part of the community."28
Thus, even a lapse of time of over forty years between the happening
of an event and its publication has been held to be insufficient to destroy
the newsworthiness privilege claimed by the defendants in the Wagner
case. However, in the Wagner case, the Court of Appeals, in its first
opinion, held that a lapse of time of only four months was sufficient to
allow Mrs. Wagner to recover. While the Court of Appeals reversed itself
on re-hearing, the decision for the publishing companies did not arise from
a finding that the four month time lapse between the crime and the
appearance of the magazine articles was insufficient to sustain the plain-
25 113 F. 2d 806 (2d. Cir. 1940). See, Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises 119 N.W. 2d 914
(1963).
26 113 F. 2d 806, 807.
27251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d. 118 (1948). 281d. at 253, 37 So. 2d. at 121.
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tiffs' case. Rather the reversal was based on the disclosure that the plain-
tiff had appeared as a witness in the trial and that the magazine articles
were presented at that time. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' appear-
ance at a public trial revived the defense of newsworthiness.
In conclusion, it would seem that although the original opinion in Wag-
ner v. Fawcett Publications29 was reversed and is no longer the law, it has
fostered confusion in a somewhat settled area of a tort action which is less
than three quarters of a century old. By holding that a lapse of time be-
tween the occurence of a newsworthy event and its publication in a
magazine sold for profit would invade a plaintiff's right of privacy, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rendered a decision which is against
the prevailing weight of authority. Examination of prior authority has
shown that even a lapse of time of over forty years between the happen-
ing of the event and its subsequent publication forms no basis upon which
to destroy the newsworthiness privilege and to permit a plaintiff to re-
cover for invasion of the right of privacy.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-PLANNING
ESTATES INCIDENTAL TO SELLING LIFE INSUR-
ANCE CONSTRUED AS THE PRACTICE OF LAW
John H. Miller, a layman, was the principal stockholder and president
of a corporation which offered a service of aiding individuals in financial
and estate planning. The services rendered were either for a fee, or as a
gratuitous service incidental to another business which Mr. Miller was
engaged in, that of selling life insurance. Each customer received a report
from the corporation which usually contained suggestions relating to the
transfer of assets, the making of gifts, the use of marital deductions, the
use of inter vivos and testamentary trusts and other devices designed to
minimize taxes. Upon discovering such practices, the Oregon State Bar
brought an action to have Mr. Miller and his company enjoined from pre-
paring any estate plans involving legal analysis. The lower court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, but specifically held that such legal practices were
permissible when directly related to the selling of life insurance. This
decree was subsequently modified by the Oregon Supreme Court when it
disallowed the lower court's exemption. Oregon State Bar v. John H.
Miller & Co.,-Ore.-,385 P. 2d 181 (1963).
In analyzing the various issues of the case, the lower court found: that
the practices of the defendant could be construed as giving legal advice;
and that the defendant had gone to the extent that such advice constituted
29 307 F. 2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962).
